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Abstract 
Besides wage offers, credentials like education, work experience and skill requirements are key screening tools for 
firms in their recruitment of new employees. This paper contributes some new evidence to a relatively tiny literature on 
firms’ recruitment behaviour. In particular, our analysis is concerned with how vacancy durations vary with firms’ 
minimum wage offers and minimum job requirements (regarding education, skills, age, gender and earlier work 
experience).  
The empirical analysis is based on ten employer surveys carried out by the DGBAS on Taiwan during the period 
1996-2006. We estimate logistic discrete hazard models with a rich set of job and firm characteristics as explanatory 
variables. The results show that vacancies associated with higher wage offers take, ceteris paribus, longer to be filled. 
The impact of firms’ wage offers and credential requirements does not vary over the business cycle. However, firms 
vary their skills requirements over the business cycle: our empirical analysis shows that, for a given wage offer, 
requirements are stricter in recessions and downturns. Separating between reasons for posting vacancies turned out 
important in explaining differences in vacancy durations. The duration of vacancies due to regular turnover and 
changing business cycle condition are less affected by skill requirements than that of other vacant jobs. 
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Recruiting new employees and replacing workers that have left is costly for firms. Moreover, 
firms face several trade-offs between incurring different costs of filling vacant jobs. One is between 
the costs of spending more time searching for a good candidate and the loss in production 
associated with a longer waiting time. When firms offer a higher wage to shorten the recruitment 
time, they not only increase their wage costs but may also attract a larger number of applicants and 
thus have to spend more time in screening them. In addition to wage offers, credentials, like 
education and work experience, and other skill requirements are the most common screening tools 
for firms to weed out unqualified candidates and hence reduce screening costs. While stricter 
requirements may lower screening costs they can also prolong the time it takes to fill the vacancy. 
Adjustment of the requirements might be more efficient rather than increasing the wage offer; see 
Pissarides (1976) for an analysis. After this step, firms may also use other strategies like testing, 
psychological profiling, interviews and probation. A subtle change in the first step can significantly 
reduce the costs in the following steps.     
  Most empirical evidence on how job vacancies are filled is based on aggregate data and 
therefore focuses mainly on the role of aggregate level factors; see Devine and Kiefer (1991) and 
Mortensen and Pissarides (1999). As for individual level evidence, of which there is less, this is 
predominantly about the behavior of job searchers, their search strategies and channels they use and 
how these vary across different groups of employees; see e.g., Holzer (1987), (1988). There are 
considerably fewer studies of employers’ search behavior. This is not because of lack of interest, but 
due to dearth of appropriate data sources. What evidence there is about the behavior of firms is 
typically concerned with the efficiency of different search methods and whom employers are 
interested in hiring under different labor market conditions; see Holzer, Raphael and Stoll (2006).  
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  In this paper we exploit a data set which is rather unique insofar that it contains information 
about employers’ recruitment behavior before the vacancy is matched with an employee.
1 These 
data are used to address a number of empirical questions regarding employers’ recruitment behavior 
and allow us to interpret the results as reflecting “pure” demand side factors. 
Some of the questions asked are: How do firms adjust their skills requirements (if at all) when 
they face different labor market conditions? Will firms raise their wage offers and/or lower their job 
requirements in response to tightened labor markets? Are vacancies with higher demands with 
respect with credentials filled more easily during the recession than in the boom? The repeated 
cross-sectional data set used in the empirical analysis encompasses a whole business cycle of 
Taiwan, and can thus be exploited for an analysis of the influence of changes in the macroeconomic 
environment. In addition, we address issues related to the role of skill certificates, especially 
regarding IT and language skills, in firms’ search for younger employees. What is their importance 
relative to conventional skills credentials, like formal education? 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a brief review 
of the related literature. This is followed by a presentation of the data set used and a descriptive 
analysis of the key variables. The fourth section discusses the empirical model and some 
identification issues. The estimation results are given in Section 5. The first subsection deals with 
the relation between wage offers and vacancy requirements. Next subsections look at how this 
changes over the business cycle,  the role of firm size and specific skill requirements, changes in 
the relative weight of job requirements over the business cycle, and finally at different reasons for 
why the vacancy is posted. The last section concludes and offers some policy implications.   
                                                 
1  In a recent paper, Hall and Krueger (2008) provide some evidence for the U.S. labor market on the prevalence of new 
employees bargaining regarding wages before accepting a job offer versus accepting it on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. 
They find that about a third of newly hired workers had bargained with their current employers before accepting the job 
offer. We are aware of no other study shedding light on this issue.  
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2 Previous research 
Studies of the firm’s recruitment behavior are rare. Almost two decades ago, Devine and 
Kiefer (1991) summarized their survey of empirical research on labor market search as follows: 
“On balance, the supply side of the labor market is well studied if not perfect understood. The 
demand side is wide open…they must be supplemented by additional studies before the findings 
can be considered solid.” Fifteen years later, DeVaro (2005) notes: “(Indeed,) labor economists, 
sociologists, psychologists, and human resource management specialists have spent the last 
half-century exploiting the meager existing data sets in efforts to learn about employer recruitment 
behavior.” The reason for this state of affairs is largely the scarcity of demand-side data. Although 
firm-level data have become increasingly available, these are typically taken from the records kept 
by firms, and were set up for other than for research purposes, and so, relatively little progress with 
respect to enhancing our understanding of employers’ recruitment behavior has been made.      
Some previous work has focused on how vacancy durations are affected by employers’ choice 
of recruitment channels. Roper (1988) used vacancy data collected by a U.K. employer survey in 
the 1970s and finds that recruitment methods significantly affect vacancy durations, whereas firms’ 
wage offers are not found to have a clear and significant effect on the length of unfilled vacancies. 
Roper argues that the latter result may be caused by poor data, however. More recently, DeVaro 
(2005) has made use of U.S. data on newly hired workers collected in the early 1990s. Unlike Roper 
he finds that higher starting wages increase the duration of vacancy. He interprets this as evidence 
of longer waiting times inducing employers to increase their wage offers. Moreover, DeVaro’s study 
shows that recruitment channels have important effects on the vacancy durations. In studies using 
more recent data you would, however, expect that recruitment methods play a less important role as  
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job market information circulates more efficiently.
2 Especially, the well developed internet 
infrastructures have provided firms with a low-cost means for recruiting educated employees.
3  
Burdett and Cunningham (1998) study how firm and job characteristics affect how long it 
takes to fill a vacancy.
4 In particular they examine firms facing advance notification rules and 
therefore can try to find an eligible employee before losses occur. Variations in the tightness of job 
market, captured by the local unemployment rate, did not turn out to have any impact on vacancy 
durations.   
Holzer et al. (2006) analyze employers’ hiring behavior during the tight U.S. labor markets in 
the 1990s. The study focuses on the hiring of disadvantaged workers, like groups with criminal 
records, welfare recipients and short-term employed. The authors find that in general the demand 
for the disadvantaged job seekers increased during the boom except for severely stigmatized 
individuals with a criminal background. At the same time general credentials like work experience 
and higher education diplomas became less important. 
The study by van Ours and Ridder (1992) comes closest to ours. They have cross-sectional 
data on elapsed vacancy durations and some information about skills required of the applicants and 
a few job characteristics.
5 They find that most of the characteristics did not affect vacancy 
durations, some evidence of positive duration dependence and that unobserved heterogeneity is 
important in explaining variation in durations. van Ours and Ridder also have information about the 
number of applicants for each vacancy and their analysis thereof indicates that employer search is 
most non-sequential. 
                                                 
2  See Autor (2001), who also provides some counter-arguments. 
3  Strong competition in the Taiwanese media industry has lowered the costs of recruitment advertisement, especially for 
internet users. Nevertheless, the employer survey shows that most firms continue using multiple search methods. 
4  They find that large firms’ vacancies are filled more quickly and that jobs with higher skills requirements take longer 
to fill. 
5  van Ours and Ridder (1992) did not have information about the wage offers associated with the vacancies. Their 
estimating sample excluded observations for job titles with multiple vacancies.  
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The data used in the current paper differ from those exploited in the analyses mentioned above. 
In particular, in earlier studies the wage is in fact the starting wage paid to the newly hired 
employee, whereas we focus on the pre-match wage offer associated with the job vacancy. The 
duration observed in most other papers also includes the testing and interview period. In our data set, 
it is possible to directly observe the trade-off among wage offers, requirements and time. Note also, 
that in the current paper (as in van Ours and Ridder (1992)) the individual characteristics are those 
required by the firm, and not the traits observed ex post. As we have only one observation per 
vacancy, we can not examine how wage offers and requirements develops with the duration of the 
vacancy. On the other hand, we have a large number of observations on vacancies, wage offers and 
requirements from different years during a full business cycle.     
3 Data description 
The analysis is based on data from an annual survey, “The Job Vacancy and Employment 
Status Survey”, which was carried out by the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and 
Statistics of Taiwan. The data were collected by means of a mail questionnaire with a telephone 
interview follow-up.
6 The sample used in the analysis in this paper covers ten years from 1996 to 
2006 except for 1999 that was suspended.
7 The sample was stratified by the size of the industries 
(number of employees) as well as by number of firms in each four digit industry. For some 
industries with a small number of firms, a rotating sample scheme was adopted to reduce the burden 
of firms in answering the questionnaire. A representative sample with about 8,000 firms was 
interviewed in May or June each year; see Table 1 for details. The original data set has 35,336 job 
vacancies and we make use of 35,137 observations after dropping some incomplete answers, 
                                                 
6  The firms have been followed for many years and the response rates, according to DGBAS exceeded ninety per cent 
in all years. For example, the response rates were 94% in 2003 and 2004, 92% and 90% in 2005 and 2006 respectively.    
7  This was due to a huge earth quake on Taiwan in September 1999. The survey was planned to be conducted shortly 
after the disaster happened.  
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part-time jobs and a few small industries.
8 There is not a generally accepted definition of a job 
vacancy. In the data source of the current study, a vacancy is characterised by the existence of at 
least one specific position for which the employer is actively recruiting applicants from outside the 
firm to fill the position. Thus, this definition excludes job openings that occur when “the right 
employee” turns up. These are not likely to make up a significant portion of all job openings. 
Notably, the vacancy concept of the Survey does not impose a restriction on the time interval during 
which the position has to be filled. 
 
3.1 Vacancies, vacancy durations and wage offers   
As shown in Table 1, data were mostly collected in either May or June (except in 1996 and 
1998). There are both pro and con arguments for a fixed date of collecting the data. Vacancies 
posted in different months may have different characteristics and durations, particularly because in 
June and July a large number of freshmen are entering the job market. Firms usually have a periodic 
recruitment scheme open for them and the time to fill vacancies could consequently be shorter. 
Sampling in different months would allow us to test whether the duration distribution differs across 
months. This will be discussed further in section 4 below. 
From Table 1 it can also be seen that there was a substantial decline in the number of 
vacancies in the deep recession year of 2001 with a historically high, negative GDP growth rate in 
Taiwan. However, as the economy recovered, the number of vacant jobs quickly returned to former 
levels. The unemployment rate decreased rather slowly, though. The period under study covers a 
full business cycle and thus enables us to compare firms’ recruitment behaviors in boom and 
recession years. There is a trendwise decline in the average vacancy durations independently of the 
                                                 
8  The survey does not contain direct information on working hours. We define a job as a part-time job when the wage 
offer associated with the vacancy is less than half of the minimum wage.    
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macro-economic conditions, which is presumably due to improved matching technologies resulting 
in a higher pace of transmission of job information. Wages have been deflated by the yearly CPI 
index. The year with the lowest number of vacancies has the highest mean wage offer. Obviously, 
the recession reduced the job opportunities for low paid workers more than high paid workers. 
Insert Table 1 here 
3.2 Job requirements 
Naturally, the requirements firms make for potential job applicants inform them something 
about the skills necessary to perform the job in question, but they can also serve a signalling 
function reducing the search costs for both firms and job seekers. The educational requirements, 
which are shown in Table 2, indicate that for most of their vacancies firms require that applicants 
have one of the three major educational levels in Taiwan. Vacancies for which there are no specified 
educational requirements are not associated with a shorter length of search. 
Insert Table 2 here 
Requirements that the job holder should be of a specific gender reflect job characteristics and 
in some cases probably also employers’ preferences. Half of the vacant jobs are “gender-neutral”. 
Of the other half, the majority is targeting male applicants. On Taiwan, the male labour force 
participation rate is about 20 percentage points higher than for women, whereas the unemployment 
rate for males has always been about one per cent higher than for woman. On average, the 
vacancies posted specifically for male applicants take longer to fill. 
Age requirements are recorded as a range with a maximum and a minimum. The most 
common age limitation is an age ceiling for new entrants because young workers are more  
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adaptable and lower paid. Dummy variables for the minimum age required of the job holder to be 
forty years or above and for jobs without any age restrictions, have been created to capture 
vacancies available to elderly workers. 
Information of certificate requirements and reasons for opening the vacancy (as reported by 
the firm) is available from years 2003 to 2006. More than eighty percent of the vacancies do not 
require a specific skills certificate or license. The most common requirements are professional 
licenses (such as for pharmaceutical and nurses work) and certificates of language proficiency 
(predominantly in English). Although modern workplaces widely apply computer technology, IT 
certificates do not seem to play an important role in the job search process.   
A little over half of the vacancies are opened because of regular worker turnover and the 
average duration is shortest for these vacancies. Jobs under special working environments like Dirty, 
Dangerous and Difficult (3D) are associated with longer time to find workers, as are vacancies 
affected by affirmative action regulations (that is, jobs targeted at hiring disabled workers or the 
aboriginal  people  of  Taiwan.      
3.3 The empirical model 
In the following we will estimate a reduced form employer’s search model within the 
framework of a hazard function approach. A standard employer search model (Lippman and McCall, 
1976) models the probability that a vacant job is filled, θ (t), during an infinitesimal short period (t, 
t+dt), given that it has been open until t, as the product of the arrival rate of applicants, A(t), and the 
probability that an applicant is acceptable, P(t): 
 
  θ  ( t ) d t   =   A ( t )   P ( t )   d t             ( 1 )   
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As our data do not contain information about arrival rates and other variables allowing us to 
identify the two RHS components in (1), we estimate a reduced form: 
 
  θ (t) = θ (t, X), 
 
where X is a vector of vacancy and firm characteristics. The econometric analysis focuses on the 
links between vacancy durations and employers’ recruitment strategies with respect to wage offers 
and job requirements. Why do we observe vacancies? The simple answer is because it takes time to 
find suitable employees.
9 In searching for new suitable employees firms face a trade-off between 
the speed of hiring and the quality of the worker-job match, that is, it can hire a new worker 
relatively quickly but at the expense of obtaining an employee who is less productive than expected.   
 
As an applicant’s productivity is not directly observed by firms, they can use two alternative 
strategies. First, the firm can offer higher wages than competitors in the hope of attracting better 
performing employees. This strategy has the advantage speeding up the hiring process but runs the 
risk of ending up with a poor match. A second strategy is to use of workers’ characteristics and 
credentials to assess the productivity of workers. This increases the likelihood of a good match, but 
takes longer time. Since both firms and jobs differ with respect to the importance of job-worker 
match quality for corporate performance, we have to account for firm differences and skill levels of 
the vacant jobs. 
 
Furthermore, we would expect labour market conditions to affect firms’ recruitment strategies. 
                                                 
9  When a firm posts a vacancy it does not necessarily imply that there is nobody at the time performing the tasks 
associated with the vacant job. Many vacancies are opened because the current job holder will leave, e.g., due to 
retirement, promotion or a move to another job (after the advance notification period has expired).  
 11
In a tight labor market a company can choose between two policies in addressing the problem of 
labor shortage. It can raise its wage offer and hope this increases the pool of applicants to the vacant 
job. Or, it can lower its recruitment standards, that is, put less weight on job requirements such as 
formal education, previous experience and certificates. Again, as stressed in the analyses of 
Pissarides (1976) and Holzer et al. (2006), the firm’s choice of strategy involves balancing of two 
opposing influences on profits: the speed at which the vacancy is filled and the quality of the match, 
respectively. The decision also depends on the importance of the vacant position for short- and 
long-run profits. To what extent firms’ vary their wage offers and job requirements over the 
business cycle is an empirical issue on which this paper aims at shedding some new light. Thus, we 
include the firm’s wage offer associated with the vacancy as well as a number of job requirement 
variables (age, gender, work experience, education and certificates) in X and estimate the duration 
models for different years during a full business cycle. 
 
A novel feature of the empirical analysis in this paper is that we distinguish between categories 
of vacancies according to the reasons they were opened. We expect this to be of some importance as 
the different categories differ with respect to the cost and benefits from screening the employees 
more carefully. In particular, we expect that the duration of vacancies due to regular employee 
turnover is affected by different factors than the time it takes to fill new jobs, jobs created as part of 
organisational adjustment or jobs requiring skills that are new to the organization. 
 
3.4 The econometric duration model 
The econometric model we use for estimation of the determinants of the elapsed vacancy 
duration is a discrete-time logistic hazard model. In addition to the fact that this accounts for 
discrete time nature of our vacancy durations data it has the advantage that we do not have to  
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assume a specific functional form of hazard. The model is:   
( )
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  Alternatively, this can be expressed as: 
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When 0 = X , ) , ( 0 X m h is the corresponding baseline hazard. The models in this paper are 
estimated by using the logit procedure in STATA; see Jenkins (1995). The left hand side variable is 
a binary variable for whether a vacancy is still open or not. Right hand side variables in the 
estimations include besides the duration spell dummies a set of firm and vacancy characteristics.   
The data set does not allow us to observe the changes in firms’ requirements over time and 
hence no time-varying covariates are included in the models. As a consequence we cannot examine 
whether firms will increase their wage offers or loosen up the credentials requirements when the 
vacancy has been unfilled for a long time.  
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4 Identification issues   
The data used in this study originate from a number of annual repeated cross-sections of firms. 
Of the 8,000 firms that were chosen most had not posted vacancies at the time of the survey. As we 
only make use of observations of firms that have at least one vacancy, a selection problem might 
arise. In the survey, firms were asked about how long the vacancies had been open up to the end of 
the survey month (the elapsed duration). That is, we observe the listed vacancies and how long they 
have been unfilled at the time of the survey. Under repeated cross-session stock sampling longer 
durations have a higher probability of being sampled than short durations, and hence, the 
probability of observing longer duration vacancies in the data is higher. If the inflow of new 
vacancies is constant over time, we will on average observe the vacancies in the middle of their 
completed durations, that is, the actual length (completed duration) will on average be twice as long 
as our recorded interrupted spell length measure.     
The repeated stock sampling nature of the data could potentially give rise to a right hand 
censoring problem. After 2004, the survey does not recognize intervals exceeding 12 months, but 
aggregates them in to one open interval. Prior to 2004, a number of intervals exceeding 12 months 
were included and the maximum duration observed in the sample was 35 months. For consistency, 
we treat all durations exceeding 12 months as right hand censored. However, as only 1.4% of the 
vacancies fall in this category, it is not likely to have a major impact on the estimates obtained. 
4.1 Constant entry rate and different sampling months 
The cross-sectional stock sampling could cause another problem. As was first pointed out by 
Nickell (1979), estimation of duration models based on cross-sectional data, or what later has been 
called the elapsed duration (or backward recurrence time) model (Lancaster, 1990) relies on the  
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assumption of a stationary inflow rate of vacancies. When this condition does not hold, the 
estimated hazard functions using elapsed duration data can give rise to seriously misleading 
estimates that reflect variations in the inflow rate rather than in factors determining durations.
10 
Consequently, in the following paragraphs we discuss the nature of vacancy data used and the 
stationarity of vacancy inflow rates at some length.     
A first thing worth noting is that the vacancy durations seem to be quite randomly scattered 
over the year. No matter in which month vacancies are observed, the probabilities of observing 
short spells seem to be quite similar. In years 1996, 1997 and 1998, three waves of the survey were 
conducted in August, May and October, respectively. We compare these three consecutive years as 
during the period economics conditions in Taiwan were quite stable and so, the duration data is not 
likely to be influenced by the business cycle. From Figure 1 we can see that the vacancy duration 
distributions are quite similar in all three years.
11  
Second, the main reason firms report opening job vacancies is “dealing with regular employee 
turnover”, which does not display any seasonal variation. Vacancies opened for seasonal variations 
in demand make up only 1.4 percent of the vacancies in the data set.  This is partly because most 
firms hire part-time workers to meet seasonal labor demand variations, and in constructing the 
sample for this study we have excluded vacancies for part-time work. A third factor that could affect 
the inflow of job vacancies is that most firms usually recruit young people close to the time after 
they have graduated, i.e., during the summer. To check for this, we have estimated the duration 
model on a smaller sample which excludes vacancies targeted for young people (below 30 years of 
                                                 
10  One solution for handling this problem has been suggested by Guell and Hu (2006). We cannot apply it because it 
requires some overlapping durations in two consecutive repeated cross-section data sets in order to construct matched 
groups. In an early paper, Nickell (1979), who had access to cross-sectional data only, uses estimates for the probability 
that the individuals in his sample have entered unemployment to deal with the potential violation of the stationarity 
assumption. 
11  A formal statistical test (Kolmogorov-Smirnov) for the equality of distributions marginally rejects the equality, 
though.  
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age) only. The results differ only marginally, and never in sign, as compared to those for the whole 
sample. Hence we conclude that there is little reason to expect that variations in the vacancy inflow 
rate will be significantly contaminating the elapsed duration model estimates.       
Insert Figure 1 here 
4.2 Unobserved heterogeneity 
The attractiveness of a vacancy and how easy it is to fill it is of course influenced by several 
characteristics, not only of the job in question, but also of the firm. Some of these are not observed 
in the data. A typical factor of this kind is profitability or some other corporate performance 
measure. Other common considerations for job applicants include firms’ dividend and bonus 
policies (particularly in the innovative industries), non-monetary benefits, and the overall reputation 
of the firm. As these factors cannot be perfectly observed, the estimated models are likely to 
over-estimate the degree of negative duration dependence in the hazard, or under-estimate the 
degree of positive duration dependence (Lancaster, 1990). 
We have estimated logistic models with controls for random effects to take account for the 
heterogeneity; see Appendix 1. The test for heterogeneity is under the assumption that the “error 
term” has a Normal distribution with mean zero. The results show that for some years the model 
passes test of frailty and more importantly that most of the coefficients do not change much.
12 Thus, 
unobserved heterogeneity plays a minor role in explaining the observed variations in the vacancy 
durations. 
5 Findings and discussion 
                                                 
12  Models that combine two successive years and control for the frailty are harder to interpret. This could be caused by 
the rotating sampling nature in some of the smaller industries.  
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We can to begin with at the baseline hazard estimates which are displayed in Figure 
2.   Notably, the first three months and sixth month have considerably higher exit probabilities than 
other months.   As we will see below, the estimates change somewhat when we control for other 
variables, but also then we find that vacancies are more likely to be filled in first three months and 
during the sixth month.  In particular there is a large spike at the sixth month that could be caused 
by a memory error or some institutional reason.
13  For example, some of the respondents may be 
thinking in terms of quarters, and as a consequence, answers “cluster” at three or six months. 
        Insert  Figure  2  and  Table  3  here 
 5.1 Wage offers 
Table 3 reports estimates for specifications including both vacancy and firm 
characteristics. An increase in a variable that carries a positive coefficient increases the probability 
that a vacancy is filled, i.e., shortens the duration of the vacancy. We start by looking at the 
estimates in the first column which are from the whole period under study. A key finding is that the 
higher the (minimum) wage offer is, the longer it takes to fill the vacancy. There are two forces 
pushing and pulling the relationship between the wage offer and the time a vacancy is unfilled in 
opposite directions. The first is that firms can trade wage offers for time (the waiting cost). The 
other is that higher paid jobs often take longer time to fill because firms are more willing to spend 
time on screening in order to find the right employees for the higher paid positions. Our estimates 
imply that the latter effect dominates. When we add a dummy for vacancies in the highest decile of 
the wage offer distribution or for high level occupations, the wage offer variable still attaches a 
negatively signed coefficient. This result resembles those in Adams et al. (2002) and DeVaro (2005), 
who also found a positive relation between the starting wage and the duration of the vacancy, but 
                                                 
13  We have checked a number of possibilities but have not found any plausible institutional explanations for the sixth 
month spike.  
 17
differs from those obtained in other studies by Roper (1988), Burdett and Cunningham (1998), and 
Andrews et al. (2007), who found no relationship. It should be noted that because the starting wage 
in these studies is observed after the vacancy has been filled it could have been influenced by 
subsequent negotiations between the employee and the employer. The wage offer concept used in 
this study is of pre-match nature, reflecting only the behavior of the firm. 
 
5.2 Business cycle conditions 
Columns 2 to 4 in Table 3 contain estimates from different business cycle years. Column 2 has 
years 1997 and 1998 when both the overall economy and the labor market conditions were good. In 
column 3 we find years 2001 and 2002 which were recession years. The last column for years 2005 
and 2006 represent a recovery. To make more efficient use of the information in the data set, we 
combine observations for two adjacent years.     
Other things equal, firms appear to find workers more quickly in recent years. This could be 
due to improved job-worker matching technology (internet, ICT, etc.).
14   It is interesting to 
examine how firms change their recruitment requirements over the business cycle.   A first point to 
notice is that the influence of wage offers on vacancy durations does not vary much over the 
business cycle. Ceteris paribus, firms paying higher wages are expected to shorten recruitment time 
in the recession. Surprisingly, the results show no differences across labor market conditions. As we 
will see below, this result is robust to inclusion of additional explanatory variables picking up 
variation in job requirements but not to a division of the sample into sub-samples according to 
reason the vacancy was posted. 
                                                 
14  This finding is not consistent with notions of jobs becoming more specialised or more demanding (requiring a 
broader set of skills). Note, however, that we control for at least some of these factors in the estimations.  
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 Vacancies targeted at elderly workers, defined as the age range over 40 years of age, are 
relatively hard to fill in boom years, even when the Taiwanese economy recovered strongly during 
the last two years of the period under study. During recession years, there is no significant 
difference in the duration of vacancies targeting different age groups.   
Education and experience are the most commonly used credentials for screening 
applicants.  The estimates show quite surprisingly that stronger experience requirements slightly 
decrease the duration of a vacancy. Job vacancies requiring a bachelor’s or higher university degree 
take somewhat shorter time to fill, save the recession years. The duration of vacancies without any 
specific educational requirements varies strongly with labor market conditions.  They are more 
difficult to fill in boom years, but do not differ from other vacancies during the recovery. However, 
two factors complicate the interpretation of the results. First, the educational expansion after year 
2000 affected the supply of highly educated workers and will therefore weaken the signaling 
function of education. Second, the firms employing low-skilled workers have increasingly moved 
their production to low labor cost countries (chiefly China) and have consequently reduced their 
demand for the workers with little education.  These two effects interact with the impact of the 
business cycle on educational requirements. 
5.3 Firm size 
Larger firms recruit employees in shorter time than smaller firms do. This is especially the 
case in recessions, probably reflecting the fact that big firms are more attractive because workers 
are more concerned with the job security during periods of low growth and believe that larger firms 
are more able to cope with the business cycle risks. This result has also been found in previous 
studies (van Ours and Ridder (1992), Burdett and Cunningham (1998), Andrews et. al. 
(2007)).   Larger firms are also likely to open up more vacancies than smaller firms. The number of  
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vacancies posted by the firm is controlled for in the estimation. As expected, the more vacancies a 
firm has, the longer they remain unfilled.    
It should also be noted that smaller firms may be more careful in selecting their employees 
while large firms have better opportunities for finding alternative use for what turned out to be a 
bad job-worker match; see Garen (1985) for an analysis. In other words, smaller firms have to know 
their job applicants better. Another reason for the difference is that larger firms are more likely to 
have HRM departments and hence can exploit scale and scope economies in hiring.   
5.4 Certificate requirements   
The results concerning skill requirements are given in Table 4.  As can be seen from a 
comparison of the two first columns, entering the certificate requirements variables leads to only 
minor changes in the estimates to the educational requirements variables. Computer and language 
(predominantly in English) are the most common required skills but only language certificates turn 
out to significantly affect the duration of vacancies. Also, the professional certificate limitations are 
associated with longer durations.  However, this does not mean that computer and language 
certificate are not important. In wage offer regressions given in Appendix 2, both computer and 
language skill criteria have a positive impact on firms’ wage offers.
15 The influence of skill 
requirements may be captured by the wage offer variable, which, as we have seen, has a positive 
impact on the duration of the vacancy. 
Insert Table 4 here 
5.5 Wage offers and requirement over the business cycle 
Next we turn to consider whether and how the relationship between wage offers and the 
                                                 
15  This is consistent with learning models. When workers are new in the firm employers pay them based on observable 
ability, but as they learn more about their employees, wages will increasingly reflect unobserved ability factors.    
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qualifications requirements varies over the business cycle. Following Pissarides (1976) we expect to 
find that when times are good (bad) the relation between qualifications requirements and wage 
offers is weaker. This is because in good times when firms have difficulties recruiting employees, 
they are less likely to make strong demands on qualifications for a given wage offer, and in bad 
times the opposite applies.   
In order to shed light on this we estimate simple regressions for each year where the dependent 
variable is the log of firm’s minimum wage offer divided by the average of all minimum wage 
offers. The key explanatory variables are the job requirement and certificate dummies (same as in 
Table 4). In addition we control for the number of vacancies posted, industry, region and size of 
firm. The estimates to the skills requirements dummies are collected in Table 5. 
We find some support for the hypothesis that for a given relative wage offer, the qualifications 
requirements are stronger during economic downturn years. This pattern is clearly discernible for 
the estimates to the experience and age requirements indicators. The age and experience 
requirements are stronger in the recession years and are dropped as the economy improves. As for 
the educational requirements, the picture is more blurred. On the one hand, if one considers the 
period as from 2001, which coincides with the expansion of higher education, we may notice 
considerably lower estimates for the recovery years (2004-6) than for the recession years (2001-2). 
On the other hand, the pattern in the second half of the nineties is less clear. 
       I n s e r t   T a b l e   5   h e r e  
5.6 Reasons for posting a vacancy  
Unlike previous studies, in this paper the data allow us to distinguish between different 
reasons for opening the job vacancies and hence we can see whether this makes any difference for  
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employers’ search behavior. The reasons for posting the job vacancy are indeed found to play a 
critical role for the time it takes to find new employees. Firms recruiting in order to replace regular 
employee turnover, and large firms in particular, are able to fill their vacancies more quickly than 
others. In connection with these vacancies firms are likely know what type of employees they are 
looking for, whereas for other types of vacancies this does not necessarily hold. Thus, vacancies for 
other reasons take longer time to be filled; see column 3 in Table 4. Vacancies due to affirmative 
regulations and 3D tasks are hard to fill. Not surprisingly, vacancies which are posted because the 
firms need certain skills that are not available among their current workers – that is, new skills to 
the firm – also take longer time to fill. Controlling for the reason the job vacancy was posted, the 
coefficient to the large firm dummy becomes smaller. This implies that the firm size effect 
discussed above may in part be picking up different reasons for posting vacancies. 
In Table 6 we report separate estimations for the three most common reasons of posting 
vacancies: regular turnover, business cycle adjustments and new positions. For job vacancies due to 
regular employee turnover, which make up over half of all the vacancies, firms can adopt a prior 
notification strategy (Burdett and Cunningham (1998)) or a “stockpiling” strategy (Bishop and 
Barron (1984)). We would not expect to find any differences between large and small firms here. 
And we do not. One additional reason for this finding could be that regular turnover jobs are 
typically of short-term nature and both employers and prospective employees do not therefore 
spend much time and effort on search. 
The vacancy opened because of regular worker turnover also differs in another respect: the 
impact of the wage offer of the time it takes to fill the vacancy is lower than for other vacant jobs. 
Another thing shown by the estimations is that it is easier for large firms to fill new vacant positions. 
The explanation for the difference is presumably that big firms have personnel departments or 
human resources specialists to handle more complicated cases and new situations.    
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Insert Table 6 here 
6 Concluding remarks 
This study has made use of a unique vacancy survey data set to shed new light on the little 
researched topic of firms’ recruitment behavior. The survey provides information from the firms 
about both minimum wage offers and minimum requirements of job holders and allows us to 
distinguish between different reasons for why the firm opened the job vacancy. Obviously, wage 
offers are one of the key instruments in attracting and recruiting new employees. We find that it 
takes longer time for firms to fill vacant jobs with higher wage offers, even after controlling for 
requirements regarding the job holders’ gender, age, formal education, skills and previous work 
experience. Thus, we find no support for notions that firms are willing to offer higher wages in 
order to gain shorter vacancy durations. 
We find no clear impact of business cycle conditions on the relation between educational 
credentials and vacancy durations. Also, the impact of firms’ wage offers on vacancy durations does 
not vary over the business cycle. However, we do find some support for the notion that employers 
adjust their qualifications requirements (for a given wage offer) over the business cycle. Thus, as 
was already pointed out in Pissarides (1976), firms’ search policies involve both wage and 
requirement adjustments.   
Furthermore, we find that it takes longer time for firms to fill vacancies for low skilled and 
elderly workers in boom years, whereas in recession years there are no differences between target 
employee groups. Vacancies posted by large firms are filled faster than in smaller firms.  
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The most frequently required skills credentials pertain to language and IT skills. Of these two, 
only language certificate requirements are found to affect duration of vacancies (positively). Other 
less common professional certificates requirements are associated longer vacancy durations. 
Distinguishing between the reasons for why the employers posted the vacancies turned out to 
be important. The most common reason for opening a vacancy is regular employee turnover. These 
vacancies are found to be filled more quickly than other vacancies and the impact of wage offers, 
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Figure 1. Distribution of vacancy durations in different months 
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Table 1. Vacancies, durations, wage offers and macro indicators, 1996-2006 











































































































Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
1996-2006     Share  (%)    Duration   
Education    Bachelor or above  29.45  3.62 
Below bachelor’s degree  62.4  3.74 
No educational requirements  8.15  4.13 
Gender   Male  41.03  4.01 
Female 14.47  3.51 
No gender requirements  44.5  3.55 
Firm size  1-29  11.93  3.82 
(# of employees)  30-49  7.01  4.15 
 50-99  15.16  4.09 
  100-199 18.64  3.68 
  200-499 24.31  3.68 
  500 +  22.95  3.46 
Age    40 or above  46.17  3.86 
40 below and no restrictions  53.83  3.63 
Experience  2 year above  23.96  3.78 
1 year or No Experience  76.04  3.73 
     
2003-2006      
Certificate Occupational  license  6.83  3.31 
Professional 2.59  3.33 
IT 1.46  3.17 
Language 6.81  3.02 
Other 0.33  4.29 
No certificate requirement  81.97  3.15 
    
Reasons for    New position  12.99  3.15 
opening of    Seasonal adjustment  1.53  3.4 
vacancy Business  cycle  14.22  3.21 
  Organizational adjustment  6.74  2.99 
  New skills needed  4.8  4.03 
  Regular turnover  54.57  2.95 
  3D (dirty, dangerous, difficult)  4.16  4.55 
  Affirmative action job  0.45  4.89 
  Other 0.53  4.43  
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Table 3. Estimates of logistic hazard, 1996-2006 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 









tion ( months) 
    
D1(0-1)  1.178 1.499 1.829 2.001 
 (0.289)***  (0.661)**  (0.778)**  (0.583)*** 
D2(1-2) 1.196  1.622  1.852  2.110 
 (0.289)***  (0.661)**  (0.780)**  (0.583)*** 
D3(2-3)  1.451 1.918 1.874 2.328 
 (0.289)***  (0.662)***  (0.780)**  (0.584)*** 
D4(3-4)  0.106 0.690 0.530 0.890 
  (0.290) (0.664) (0.783) (0.586) 
D5(4-5)  0.060 0.565 0.684 0.451 
  (0.290) (0.664) (0.783) (0.587) 
D6(5-6)  2.016 2.507 2.321 2.959 
  (0.290)*** (0.663)*** (0.782)*** (0.585)*** 
D7(6-7) -0.439  -0.980  0.230  0.346 
  (0.295) (0.689) (0.792) (0.596) 
D8(7-8)  -0.052 0.004 -0.298 0.509 
  (0.293) (0.673) (0.802) (0.595) 
D9(9.-12)  1.179 1.921 1.569 1.674 
 (0.290)***  (0.662)***  (0.780)**  (0.585)*** 
Ln Wage Offer  -0.227 -0.264 -0.280 -0.281 
  (0.029)*** (0.065)*** (0.077)*** (0.058)*** 
Job Requirements      
Work  experience  0.025 0.018 0.022 0.019 
 (0.005)***  (0.011)  (0.014)  (0.010)* 
Age  40+  -0.099 -0.152 -0.065 -0.120 
 (0.014)***  (0.033)***  (0.040)  (0.028)*** 
Education:      
College or above  -0.034  0.070  -0.072  -0.028 
(Ref: High school or below)  (0.018)*  (0.042)*  (0.046)  (0.034) 
No educational requirements  -0.102  -0.204  0.105  -0.113 
 (0.025)***  (0.057)***  (0.090)  (0.043)*** 
Firm size:       
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30-49 -0.059  -0.222  -0.119  0.060 
 (0.031)*  (0.070)***  (0.092)  (0.060) 
50-99 -0.024  -0.180  -0.095  0.009 
 (0.026)  (0.058)***  (0.079)  (0.049) 
100-199 0.113  0.107  0.195  0.128 
 (0.025)***  (0.058)*  (0.075)***  (0.049)*** 
200-499  0.130 0.152 0.169 0.162 
 (0.024)***  (0.058)***  (0.070)**  (0.047)*** 
500  or  above  0.238 0.162 0.422 0.243 
  (0.026)*** (0.061)*** (0.074)*** (0.051)*** 
Number of vac.  -0.008 -0.014 -0.015 -0.006 
  (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** 
Other controls  Gender, Industry, Area and Year 
Log likelihood  -71529.76  -15095.96  -9221.86  -17958.71 
#Observations 131221  29884  16701  30540 
























Table 4. Additional requirements and reasons for opening of vacancy, 2003-2006 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Ln  Wage  Offer  -0.254 -0.252 -0.218 
  (0.043)*** (0.043)*** (0.044)*** 
Job Requirements     
Years of work experience  0.026  0.026  0.026 
  (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** 
Age:  40+  -0.059 -0.057 -0.046 
 (0.021)***  (0.021)***  (0.021)** 
Education:     
College  or  above  -0.070 -0.080 -0.089 
  (0.025)*** (0.025)*** (0.026)*** 
No educational requirements  -0.096  -0.098  -0.046 
 (0.034)***  (0.034)***  (0.035) 
Firm size:     
30-49 0.042  0.042  0.026 
  (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 
50-99 0.024  0.029  0.008 
  (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
100-199 0.101  0.104  0.063 
 (0.036)***  (0.036)***  (0.036)* 
200-499 0.117  0.121  0.081 
 (0.036)***  (0.036)***  (0.036)** 
500 or above  0.210  0.211  0.160 
  (0.038)*** (0.038)*** (0.038)*** 
Number  of  vacancies    -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
  (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Certificate required     
Licence   -0.049  -0.054 
   (0.053)  (0.053) 
Professional     -0.176  -0.173 
   (0.062)***  (0.063)*** 
IT     -0.010  -0.005 
   (0.079)  (0.079) 
Language   0.069  0.070  
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   (0.040)*  (0.040)* 
Other   -0.344  -0.341 
   (0.156)**  (0.156)** 
Reason for vacancy     
New vacancy      -0.046 
     (0.030) 
Seasonal demand change      -0.226 
     (0.077)*** 
Business cycle adjustment      -0.092 
     (0.029)*** 
Organization adjustment      -0.011 
     (0.040) 
New skills needed      -0.400 
     (0.044)*** 
3D vacancy      -0.521 
     (0.047)*** 
Affirmative action      -0.573 
     (0.133)*** 
Other     -0.464 
     (0.123)*** 
Other controls    D1~D9 spells, Gender, Industry, Area and Year 
Log  likelihood  -32812.82 -32806.09 -32617.77 
Observations 55672  55672  55543 















Table 5. Relative wage offer equation estimates 1996-2006   
 





























































































































           
Table 6. Estimates by reasons for vacancy openings 2003-2006 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Regular Turnover  Business Cycle  New Position, Org. 
Adjustm., New Skills 
needed 
Ln Wage Offer  -0.115 -0.414 -0.178 
 (0.060)*  (0.132)***  (0.123) 
Job Requirements     
Years of work experience  0.028  0.025  0.021 
 (0.011)**  (0.020)  (0.020) 
Age:  40+  -0.059 -0.123 -0.016 
 (0.029)**  (0.059)**  (0.062) 
Education:     
College  or  above  -0.063 -0.234 -0.130 
  (0.036)* (0.066)*** (0.071)* 
No educational requirements  -0.046  -0.095  -0.180 
 (0.047)  (0.112)  (0.114) 
Firm size:     
30-49 -0.001  0.031  0.221  
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  (0.062) (0.125) (0.152) 
50-99 -0.029  0.015  0.361 
 (0.051)  (0.114)  (0.126)*** 
100-199 0.027  0.079  0.345 
 (0.049)  (0.112)  (0.121)*** 
200-499 0.026  0.193  0.376 
 (0.049)  (0.107)*  (0.120)*** 
500 or above  0.077  0.305  0.544 
 (0.052)  (0.114)***  (0.124)*** 
Number of vacancies  -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 
  (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** 
Certificate Required:     
Licence -0.045  0.001  -0.273 
  (0.065) (0.218) (0.182) 
Professional   -0.307  -0.239  0.263 
 (0.083)***  (0.185)  (0.205) 
IT   0.034  0.022  0.090 
 (0.117)  (0.179)  (0.203) 
Language -0.028  0.181  0.312 
 (0.060)  (0.098)*  (0.109)*** 
Other  -0.329 -0.447 -0.758 
  (0.215) (0.447) (0.482) 
Other controls  D1~D9 spells, Gender, Industry, Area and Year   
Log likelihood  -17156.61  -4651.56  -8105.03 
Observations 28324  8037  14142 















Appendix 1. Estimations with controls for frailty 
 1998  2001  2004  2006 
Duration:      
D1 (0-1)  5.655  0.101  3.823  5.182 
  (1.264)*** (2.866) (0.933)***  (0.923)*** 
D2 (1-2)  5.741  1.284  2.542  5.443 
 (1.265)***  (1.262)  (2.817)  (0.925)*** 
D3 (2-3)  6.072  0.487  4.295  5.636 
  (1.266)*** (2.867) (0.935)***  (0.926)*** 
D4  (3-4)  4.715 -1.078 2.879 2.593 
  (1.269)*** (2.869) (0.936)*** (3.250) 
D5  (4-5)  4.044 -0.837 2.424 3.630 
  (1.273)*** (2.869) (0.938)***  (0.930)*** 
D6 (5-6)  6.546  0.789  3.918  4.808 
 (1.268)***  (2.868)  (2.818)  (3.250) 
D7 (6-7)  -4.962  -1.100  2.749  -0.491 
 (2.215)**  (2.873)  (0.946)***  (0.976) 
D8  (7-8)  7.604 -0.369 2.020 2.250 
 (2.166)***  (1.286)  (2.821)  (3.254) 
D9 (9-12)  4.917  0.233  3.181  3.739 
  (1.128)*** (1.337) (0.963)***  (0.994)*** 
Ln wage offer  -0.506 -0.149 -0.357 -0.462 
  (0.109)*** (0.122) (0.087)***  (0.084)*** 
Job Requirements      
Working  Experience 0.033 -0.011 0.037 0.015 
  (0.016)** (0.022) (0.016)** (0.014) 
Age 40+  -0.085  -0.002  0.053  -0.115 
  (0.057) (0.066) (0.040)  (0.040)*** 
Education:      
College 0.101  -0.074  -0.087  -0.046 
(Ref: High School)  (0.065)  (0.072)  (0.049)*  (0.050) 
No restriction  -0.347  0.061  -0.057  -0.134 
 (0.105)***  (0.149)  (0.074)  (0.063)** 
Firm size:      
30-49  -0.117 0.399 -0.008 0.060  
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 (0.125)  (0.162)**  (0.089)  (0.092) 
50-99 -0.061  0.174  0.099  -0.016 
  (0.103) (0.130) (0.075) (0.073) 
100-199 0.320  0.321  0.048  0.145 
 (0.100)***  (0.124)***  (0.072)  (0.072)** 
200-499 0.301  0.366  0.167  0.189 
 (0.098)***  (0.116)***  (0.074)**  (0.070)*** 
500 or above  0.356  0.775  0.274  0.406 
  (0.104)*** (0.122)*** (0.079)*** (0.074)*** 
Vacancy number  -0.020  -0.023  -0.011  -0.011 
  (0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Other controls  Gender, Industries and Areas 
Log Likeihood  -5,125.23  -3,555.29  -8,260.30  -8,321.79 
Observations 13,240  7,433  14,886  15,298 
























Appendix 2 Wage equation estimations 2003-2006 





 Business  Cycle 
(4)  
New job vacancy 
Duration  0.004 0.001 0.005 0.003 
  (0.001)*** (0.001)* (0.002)*** (0.002)* 
Age 40+  0.001  -0.002  -0.031  0.015 
 (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.010)***  (0.011) 
Working  experience  0.063 0.057 0.057 0.064 
  (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** 
Exp2*100  -0.005 -0.006 -0.004 -0.002 
 (0.000)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001) 
Education:      
College  0.233 0.234 0.207 0.255 
 (0.004)***  (0.006)***  (0.010)***  (0.011)*** 
No educational 
requirements 
-0.043 -0.053 -0.098 -0.035 
 (0.006)***  (0.008)***  (0.018)***  (0.020)* 
Firm size:      
30-49 0.040  0.051  -0.000  0.018 
 (0.008)***  (0.011)***  (0.020)  (0.027) 
50-99 0.029  0.037  0.020  -0.018 
 (0.007)***  (0.009)***  (0.018)  (0.022) 
100-199  0.045 0.050 0.004 0.045 
 (0.006)***  (0.008)***  (0.018)  (0.021)** 
200-499  0.055 0.070 0.021 0.037 
 (0.006)***  (0.008)***  (0.017)  (0.021)* 
500 or above  0.067  0.091  0.002  0.051 
 (0.007)***  (0.009)***  (0.018)  (0.021)** 
Number  of  vacancies  -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)** 
Certificate:      
Licence 0.185  0.189  0.114  0.207 
 (0.009)***  (0.011)***  (0.035)***  (0.030)*** 
Professional   0.022  0.029  -0.031  -0.018 
 (0.011)**  (0.014)**  (0.030)  (0.032) 
IT    0.039 0.035 0.055 0.099 
 (0.014)***  (0.020)*  (0.029)*  (0.035)***  
 38
Language  0.069 0.070 0.047 0.076 
  (0.007)*** (0.010)*** (0.016)*** (0.018)*** 
Other 0.004  -0.001  -0.019  0.012 
  (0.029) (0.038) (0.073) (0.090) 
Constant  10.000 9.992 10.036 9.991 
  (0.010)*** (0.013)*** (0.025)*** (0.028)*** 
Other controls  Gender, Industry, Area and Year 
Observations 17,624  9,593  2,500  2,284 
R-squared  0.52 0.51 0.54 0.55 
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